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ABSTRACT 
Lenders use information about loan applicants to predict whether 
a person is a good or bad credit risk; however borrowers express 
reservations about disclosing their personal information.  In this 
paper we describe the design of a study in which we try to identify 
which data items have bigger privacy costs for individuals and 
whether it is possible to adjust lenders' data collection procedures 
in order to improve the privacy of the borrowers while 
maintaining or improving the accuracy of risk assessment 
methods. We aim to explore whether consumers could be 
equitably encouraged to give different information than they do 
presently, by offering incentives for disclosures.  These incentives 
are: an uncertain long term financial gain; a certain short term 
financial gain. We also explore an inequitable manipulation using 
peer pressure. The advantages and disadvantages of this 
methodological approach are also discussed. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.1.2 [Models and Principles]: User / machine systems – human 
factors, human information processing 
General Terms 
Experimentation; Human Factors.   
Keywords 
Loans; Privacy; Incentives. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In credit scoring an automated system uses a "score card" to 
classify the applicant as a “good” or “bad” risk based on their 
application form and their previous credit history; the “good” 
customers being those that are deemed more likely to repay their 
debt. The approach is limited to a set number of questions, often 
with categorical answers, and applicants' reliability is estimated 
upon how well they perform in respect to these set questions, with 
performance being how closely they match the ideal good 
borrowers' profile. There is evidence to suggest that automated 
systems are better predictors of which applicants would be “good” 
or “bad” customers than human decision makers [8]. However a 
limitation of credit scoring is that it can lead to financial exclusion 
for certain social groups, e.g. the unemployed, the low paid, the 
elderly, young people not in education / employment / training, 
black and ethnic minorities, migrants, and people with disabilities 
[2]. The automated approach is most accurate with applicants who 
score very high or low, but is relatively inaccurate for applicants 
scoring near the cut-off value between 'good and 'bad' [5]. Thus 
applicants from the more marginalized social groups may not 
match the description while still being good borrowers. Having a 
wider set of questions could increase the predictive power of score 
cards, increasing a person’s chances of showing their ability to 
repay. For example, regular payment of utility bills is information 
that could be useful but is currently not used by some lenders. 
Conversely, extra information about an applicant could also reveal 
to the lender that a person that might have previously been classed 
as a “good” customer is actually a “bad” customer.  This outcome 
could be advantageous to the applicant as well as the lender, as 
both counterparties would be protected from irresponsible 
lending. 
2. ALTERNATIVE DATA ITEMS 
A common idea in the financial services community is that 
additional information about borrowers would be beneficial to 
lenders: more data means better statistical modeling and fairer 
credit scoring [5]. There are risks that the existing data items are 
sub-optimal – the information may deliver inaccurate predictions 
for groups that are currently financially excluded, and more 
generally may be too sensitive to consumers for the value 
delivered in risk management. The potential risks of additional 
and excessive data collection are not mooted either: triggering 
consumer privacy-protective behaviours that reduce data quality 
and consequent business decisions, increased data management, 
security measures and breach costs, and so on.   
For the current study we generated a range of items with the 
intention that they would have a wide range of acceptability to 
respondents, and that they would have either intuitive face 
validity, or that they have been mentioned in past literature. We 
intuitively divided the items into seven main categories, naming 
them: the ability to make regular repayments (utility bills, tax, 
debt); one's reliability for maintaining assets and health (e.g. 
insurance claims); one's work ethic; character references (e.g. 
recommendations from others); indicators of personality (self-
esteem, materialism, self-discipline); level of education (personal 
capability, financial capability); and relationships with others 
(ability to commit to partners, current stability, family stability 
during childhood).  Several of these measures are not currently 
feasible because of practical difficulties in collecting and 
verifying the data, and others due to ethical and legal data 
protection issues. However, laws and norms change, and we wish 
to explore the current privacy space with respect to the financial 
services – i.e. what other data items are people currently willing to 
trade for financial outcomes? 
3. DATA DISCLOSURE CONCERNS 
General and specific factors contribute to peoples' data disclosure 
concerns. The perceived outcome of disclosure matters when data 
might reflect negatively on the data subject. For example, a person 
might be reluctant to reveal he is a smoker as it could result in a 
higher life insurance premium [9]. Another fear is the possibility 
of one’s privacy being invaded if the information was disclosed to 
or obtained by unauthorised persons. Contextual factors also play 
a role in privacy preferences. For instance, when shopping at a 
supermarket one’s purchases are on display to others; however 
when shopping online, if a person finds out that the retailer is 
storing their purchase information this might be viewed as an 
invasion of privacy [6]. Similarly, regarding loan applications, 
one might expect consumers to question “Is it appropriate to give 
this information in this context?”   
We assume that any new data items that could replace several 
existing data items while maintaining or increasing a score card's 
predictive power would be personal, and that people would be 
reluctant to disclose such data to lenders, even if they produce a 
net increase in their privacy. If the new data items could be 
successfully collected and verified, how could lenders convince 
consumers to give them permission to use them for credit scoring? 
4. THE USE OF INCENTIVES 
Acquisti [1] suggests that “soft paternalism” might be the answer.  
Researchers might need to design systems that “nudge” 
individuals into being more open to making certain choices. The 
way a request is “framed” affects how individuals respond to it. 
For instance, a 2002 Jupiter research study found that 82% of 
online shoppers were willing to give personal data to new 
shopping sites in exchange for the chance to win £100 [4]. Even 
modest incentives, such as “loyalty points” or a reduction in bank 
fees, can generate changes in consumer behaviour [3]. 
Social influence also impacts consumer behaviour. For example, 
Thaler and Sunstein [7] describe how Montana successfully 
adopted a large-scale educational campaign with the message 
“Most (70 percent) of Montana teens are tobacco free”. This 
strategy “nudged” college students to change their behaviour, 
leading to statistically significant decreases in smoking. 
5. STUDY DESIGN 
To investigate the impact of both monetary and social incentives, 
four different versions of a loan information request were created: 
• No Incentive.  You're asked if you would voluntarily be 
willing to provide extra information about yourself.   
• Long Term Gain – Uncertain.  As part of the scenario 
you are told that if you provide extra information about 
yourself and you are accepted for the loan, your interest 
rate will be lowered. The more information you give, 
the lower your interest rate could potentially be. 
• Short Term Gain – Certain. If you provide extra 
information about yourself you will receive payment, 
regardless of whether or not you are accepted for the 
loan. The more information you give, the more payment 
you will receive (up to £50).   
• Peer Pressure. You are asked if you would voluntarily 
be willing to provide extra information about yourself, 
and are told that 90% of other respondents willingly 
gave the lender extra information about themselves.   
When presented with information categories and asked to what 
degree of detail they would be willing to provide that information 
to a lender, we predict that participants will give more information 
when given an incentive compared to when no incentive is given.  
Concerning the alternative data items, we aim to answer the 
following questions: (1) Which types of information are people 
most reluctant or willing to share? (2) Which of these incentives 
"nudge" participants to disclose more of the new data items? 
Currently we are conducting a survey study investigating the 
extent that people rate themselves as “comfortable” in disclosing 
each of the alternative data items to lenders (also existing loan 
application form items). The effect of incentives, and whether this 
leads to greater disclosure, will be investigated in the next study. 
6. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
By investigating how people respond to a loan request with no 
incentive versus incentives, we believe that this methodology will 
allow us to gain a greater insight into people’s privacy-related 
attitudes around particular data items in a financial services 
context. Furthermore, this research is novel as the use of 
incentives has not previously been investigated in the context of 
loan requests. A disadvantage of this methodology, however, is 
that participants are asked to imagine the scenario - when faced 
with an actual loan possibility, a person might behave differently. 
Studies involving actual monetary risks could be used, if suitable 
simulations of the real world financial risk could be designed.  
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